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OBSCENITY AND SOCIAL STATICS
DAVID C. RrrN-OUSE
. . . whatever aspect of our culture is considered
each is packed with sex obsession. Its vast totality
bombards us continuously, from cradle to grave, from
all points of our living space, at almost every step of our
activity, feeling, and thinking ... In the condtions of
spiritual, moral, and mental anarchy which is becoming
characteristic of our environment, it is difficult to main-
tain sexual sanity.'
Although it is not inevitable that a study of obscenity should
concern itself primarily with sex or affairs having sexual signifi-
cance, men in their attempts to delineate the concept have
formulated it upon a sex-centralized idea.2 The purpose of this
paper is to illustrate some of the changes which have taken place
in obscenity as an idea and the struggle which has taken place in
the effort to formulate a stabiliied concept which may be applied
with some assurance of fairness by man with his limited under-
standing. Constitutional limitations have had an effect upon the
development of the concept and, indeed, time with its attendant
changes in the social order, "mores, and customs of the com-
munity be it city, state, or nation has inhibited the development
of a test which will have validity at all times or in all places.
Evolutional Development In The Concepts Of Obscenity
Problems of obscenity began to come into focus after the
invention of the printing press. With the increasing ease of
publication, the circulation of books and pamphlets was greatly
expanded; as more people became literate the influence of the
author rapidly increased. The Roman Catholic Church of the
Middle Ages was the first organized group to assume for itself
the role of the censor. That the Church should do so was natural,
1 Soroldn, The American Sex Revolution, p. 54-55, (Porter Sargent, 1956).
2 "As *our Desires, Passions, and Affections are connected, in their origin
and development, with the knowledge which we have of their objects,
Opinion may be said to be, not merely the condition of these states of
feelings, but an element of them." [Fleming, Moral Philosophy, p. 45].
for in this period the Church was concerning itself with Man
and his introspective life. Public manifestations of private thoughts
must bear the burden of the Church's approval, or the thinker
must continue his contemplations in silence. At first the power
of the Church and its ecclesiastical courts was exercised through
the medium of excommunication and admonition. Later fines,
imprisonment, and the stake were added to these sanctions. With
the coming of the Reformation in England the power of these
ecclesiastical courts waned;3 however, Henry VIII was quick to
fill the vacuum, and the Court of Star Chamber resumed the
function of censorship. In 1585 at the instigation of Archbishop
Whitgift, the court passed a regulation that no book could be
published without the perusal and approval of the Archbishop of
Canterbury or the Bishop of London.4 Performance of this tedi-
ous task was, for the most part, delegated to a chaplain.
The first half of the 17th Century in England saw the end
of the Tudor Dynasty with the passing of Elizabeth. The union
of Scotland and England was temporarily effected with the ascen-
sion of James VI of Scotland to the English throne as James I.
The period was one of consolidation of the gains in English power
-especially sea power-under the reign of Elizabeth. In 1625
Charles I replaced James I and endeavored to maintain the estab-
lished royal prerogatives against a growing popular unrest.
Charles, nevertheless, increased the fear of the adoption of the
Roman heresy when he received Panzani, the Pope's agent, in
1634. In 1649 there was found, in Cromwell, a catalyst to stimu-
late and direct the increasing discontent of the English people
with the king. The people, however, were deceived for the Puri-
tan dictatorship under Cromwell proved to be worse than that
under King Charles. The situation reached its nadir in 1659 with
aIn 1876 the paucity of their jurisdiction was judicially recognized in
Phillimore v. Machon, 19 Eccl. 310, 27 H.&W. 50.
4 Ecclesiastical censorship survives today in the Index Librorum Probibi-
torum published by the Roman Catholic Church. This Index contains a
list of some four thousands books forbidden throughout the world and
in every translation. No Roman Catholic layman may read any of
these books without special permission granted only for single books
and only in urgent cases. The edition of the Index published in 1938
includes: Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Montaigne's
Essays, Ranke's History of the Popes, Taine's History of English Litera-
ture, Hugo's Notre-Dame de Paris and his Les Miserables. The list
contains works by Hobbes, Locke, Pascal, Stendhal, and Voltaire. Craig,
Above All Liberties, p. 14 (George Allen & Unwim, Ltd, 1942).
a year of anarchy following the dissolution of Cromwell. In 1660
with the return of Charles II from France, where he had been
receiving his education and engaging in the very full and "free"
Parisian social life, "Merry England" returned in earnest. The
people were ready for a change and Charles proved to be the
very man to lead the way. As customarily happens with any
sudden and drastic change, the people went too far and there
were serious excesses. One of the most famous of these incidents
resulted in Sedley's case. Sir Charles Sedley was one of the close
friends of Charles II and was a member of a group of gay young
wits who were accustomed to gather in the taverns in the neigh-
borhood of Charing Cross and to horrify the customers and
passers-by with their unseemly words and acts. On the particular
day in question, according to Anthony a Wood, the following
events took place:
In the month of June 1663 this our author, Sir Charles
Sedley, Charles Lord Buckhurst (afterwards Earl in Mid-
dlesex) Sir Thomas Ogle, etc., were at a Cook's house at
the sign of the Cock in Bowstreet near Covent-garden,
within the liberty of Westminster and being inflamed
with strong liquors, they went into the balcony belong-
ing to that house, and putting down their breeches they
excrementized in the street: which being done, Sedley
stripped himself naked, and with eloquence preached
blasphemy to the people ... 6
For this reproach to religion and the peace and good order of the
king, Sedley was fined 500 t. Upon hearing his sentence Sedley
cavalierly replied that he now supposed that he was the first
person in all England who had to pay for his relief.
It was in an atmosphere such as this that the Crown un-
5 The great number of spicy translations from works by Italian writers was
deplored by a small but vocal group of moralists. Roger Ascham in his
Schoolmaster described the feeling of this group: ". . . Ten sermons at
Paul's cross do not so much good for moving men to true doctrine,
as one of those books do harm, with inticing men to M living... They
open, not fond and common ways to vice, but such subtle, cunning,
new and diverse shifts, to carry young wills to vanity and young wats
to mischief, to teach old bawds new school points, as the simple head
of an Englishman is not able to invent, nor never was heard of in
England before." Craig, op. cit., supra, at 17.
IsAthenae Oxonienses (1813-20), V, p. 731; King v. Sedley, Kebble, 620, 10
State Trial Ass. 93 (1663) (1st reported conviction for obscenity).
successfully brought an action, in 1708, for obscene libel against
the publisher of a book entitled The Fifteen Plagues of a Maiden-
head. The judge in dismissing the indictment commented upon
the action:
This is for printing bawdy stuff, that reflects on no
person... and a libel must be against some particular
person or persons, or against the Government. It is stuff
not fit to be mentioned publicly. If there is no remedy
in the Spiritual court, it does not follow there must be
a remedy here. There is no law to punish it.' I wish
there were: but we cannot make law. It indeed tends to
the corruption of good manners, but that is not sufficient
for us to punish it ... 8 As to the case of Sir Charles
Sedley, there was something more in that case than
showing his naked body in the balcony .. 9
Needless to say the situation of which the judge spoke was
later remedied. In more modem times Count Potocki of Montalk
was prosecuted for obscene libel under Clause 19 of the Criminal
Justice Bill passed by the House of Commons in 1923. This
clause provided that upon information on oath by an inspector
of police or any other officer of equal or superior rank, to the
satisfaction of a justice, that there is reasonable cause to suspect
that indecent or obscene articles are kept within any place for
the purpose of sale or distribution, the named place may be
searched and the offending publications seized with a fine or jail
sentence or both for the publisher. The publications seized, copies
of which were furnished the judge, turned out to be Wild Oats
(1927), Surprising Songs (1930), and Lordly Love Songs (1931).
The prosecution was required to prove that the character of the
poems was such that under the circumstances their publication
was a criminal offense. In as biased a summation as was ever cal-
culated to mislead a jury, Judge Wild remarked:
Are you going to allow a man, because he calls himself
a poet, to deflower our English language by populariz-
ing these words? Remember the standard of morals has
7 The statute imposing censorship of the press was allowed to expire in 1695.
8But see King v. Curl, 2 Strange 788, 790 ('1727), where the court said:
"... if it [a libel] tends to disturb the civil order of society, I think
it is a temporal offense."
o Regina v. Read, Fort. 98, 99 (1708).
advanced ... A man must not say he is a poet and be
filthy. He has to obey the law just the same as ordinary
citizens, and the sooner the highbrow school learns that
the better for the morality of the country.'0
After an extended deliberation the jury returned a verdict of
guilty and Montalk was sentenced to six months in prison. Upon
an examination it is apparent that Montalk was the victim of
judicial change. Prior to 1915 an indictment for obscene libel
was required to allege an express intent on the part of the accused
to publish an obscene libel accompanied by a publication with
such intent.1 After the Indictments Act of 1915 the charge was
merely required to allege that the defendant had "published an
obscene libel." Thus it was no longer necessary for the Crown to
prove that the accused had done the act with the specific intent
of publishing an obscene libel; it was only necessary to show that
the accused did the act, that he had intended to do the act which
he in fact did, and that the matter published constituted an ob-
scene libel. The law presumed from the obscene character of
the matter published that the publication had taken place with
the specific intent to publish an obscene libel. The basis for this
reasoning is the principle that a man is held to intend the natural
and probable consequence of his own acts. It is interesting to
note that it was about this time that Sir Archibald Bodkin, as
Director of Public Prosecution, was able to obtain an interpreta-
tion from the court that a publication included an obscene com-
10 Craig, op. cit. supra, at 85.
"1 The form of the indictment used was:
"that (so-and-so) being a person of a wicked and depraved mind and
disposition, and unlawfully and wickedly devising, contriving, and in-
tending, to vitiate and corrupt the morals of the liege subjects of our
said Lord and King, to debauch and poison the minds of divers of the
liege subjects of our said -Lord and King, and to raise and create in them
lustful desires, and to bring the said liege subjects into a state of wicked-
ness, lewdness and debauchery, on the ... day of. . , in the year of
our Lord, etc, and within the jurisdiction of the mid Court, unlawfully,
wickedly, maliciously, scandalously, and wilfully did publish, etc, a
certain lewd, wicked, bawdy, scandalous, and obscene libel, in the form
of a book entitled ... in which said book are contained among other
things, divers wicked, lewd, impure, scandalous, and obscene libels....
To the manifest corruption of the morals and minds of the liege
* subjects of our said Lord the King, in contempt of our said Lord the
King, and his laws, in violation of common decency, morality, and
good order, and against the peace of our said Lord and King, his Crown
and Dignity." Craig, op. cit. supra, at 88 and 89.
munication between two persons which did no harm to any third
party.
Recently, in England, insurance companies have refused to
cover obscene books12 whenever policies were issued to librarians
or the owners of private collections. Some of those insured have
obviated this difficulty by a "gentlemen's agreement" with the
insurance company that in the event of the presentation of a
claim the company will not raise the issue of "obscenity".
The most difficult problem in a study of obscenity is to
define the concept under consideration. It is in fact almost im-
possible to produce a description which is broad enough to
include all of those subjects which have been held to be obscene,
and narrow enough to exclude those which were found not to
be covered. Havelock Ellis, who devoted his life to a study of
the psychology of sex, has defined obscenity as "that which is
off the scene on the stage of life and normally hidden." 13 Al-
though Ellis' definition has been much criticized, it would seem
that ultimately obscenity is nothing more or less than those
objects to which the social group in control applies the appella-
tion.
The courts, too, have had little luck with the concept of
obscenity. The first serious attempt to define obscenity is to
be found in Regina v. Hicklin.14 This case involved a prosecu-
tion for the publication of a number of copies of a pamphlet
entitled "The Confessional Unmasked." The stated purpose of
this publication was to show the depravity of the Romish priest-
hood, the iniquity of the Confessional, and the questions put to
females in confession. At the trial it was admitted by all of the
1 2 In England and on the continent nudist magazines with pictures depicting
the daily activities and routine of life in a nudist camp appear to
occupy a favored position. As long as the subjects are arranged
naturally and there are no improprieties of position, it is permissible
for full face, full length photographs to be taken and published in the
magazine.
1sThis standard would also apply to the withdrawal of books from open
circulation in the great libraries of the world. For example, John
Robertson's Generative System (1817-1824) has been withdrawn from
the public catalogue of the British Museum Reading Room and Payne's
Villon (1878-1892) and Boccaccio's Decameron have been stricken from
the catalogue of the Bibliotheque Nationale.
14L. R 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
parties that the part of the pamphlet in question was obscene.
The question presented for the decision of the justice was
whether, that being so, the fact that the defendant had only a
good motive in preparing the pamphlet saved him from a prose-
cution for publishing obscene matter. The court held that the
prosecution was proper and Chief Justice Cockburn in a state-
ment which was mere obiter gave his famous definition of
obscenity which has become known as the Hicklin Rule:
* . . I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to de-
prave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influence, and into whose hands a publication
of this sort may fall. 15
It is apparent at once that this test is inadequate for it ex-
pands the definition of obscenity to include any picture or pub-
lication which might tend to offend anyone regardless of age
or occupation. Subjected to such a rule, almost any publication
might be found to be obscene. No author working under such
a standard could hope to create literature of any great value.
The Hicklin Rule was soon adopted by the American courts.'
As adopted, the rule was modified in United States v. Bennett,17
in which the court said that if any part of a book was obscene
under the statute the entire book was obscene within the meaning
of the statute and should be suppressed as such. This decision
produced a very curious result. In 1895 John B. Wise of Clay
Center, Kansas, was arrested and convicted of sending obscene
matter through the mails.' s The obscene matter consisted en-
tirely of a quotation taken from the Bible. Thus applying the
rule in the Bennett case we reach the result that the Holy Bible
is obscene. Such a conclusion is of course absurd, but the example
serves to illustrate the effect of carrying such a rule to its end
result.
In 1934 what is undoubtedly the most important case in the
American law of obscenity was decided. United States v. One
15 Ibid. at 371.
1 People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408 (1884); Rosen v. United States, 161 US.
29,43 (1896).
17 24 Fed.Cas. 1093, No. 14,571 (C.CSD.N.Y. 1879).
'8 Schroeder, Obscene Literature .and Constitutional Law, p. 65 (Privately
Printed for forensic uses, 1911).
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Book Entitled Ulysses'9 raised the question of whether Ulysses
came within Section 305(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 which for-
bade all persons to import obscene books into the United States.
In holding that Ulysses was not obscene within the meaning of the
statute, the court refused to follow the rule of the Hicklin case
and said instead that the proper test of obscenity is ". . . whether
the book is obscene in its dominant effect." In applying this test,
the court will consider
. . . [the] relevancy of the objectionable parts to the
theme, the established reputation of the work in the
estimation of approved critics, if the book is modern,
and the verdict of the past, if it is ancient, [as] persuasive
pieces of evidence.
2 0
However, several factors upon which the court does not elaborate,
or fails to mention entirely, enter into the decision of this case.
The court felt that the obscene passages in Ulysses were
buried in the bulk of the book and thus somehow lost their
significance to the story as a whole.21 The book contains 768 pages
and, according to the dissenting justice who followed the Hicklin
Rule, thirty-three of them contain obscene passages. This figure
represents slightly over 4% of the book.
The judges also felt that Joyce was sincere throughout the
entire book and was not engaging in pointless pornography.2
The purpose of the obscene passages is to bring out the personali-
ties of the characters as they are and to shade in and give tint
and texture to the environment in which Joyce's people co-exist.
Underlying both of these determinations is the peculiar style
in which Joyce has written his book. This treatment is perhaps
best described as a "stream of consciousness" in which the
statements of the characters run together without punctuation,
and the thought sequences vary rapidly and to a marked degree.
Such a method makes even the obscene passages difficult to un-
19 72 F.2d 705 (2d cir. 1934).
20 Ibid. at 708.
21,,... The erotic passages are submerged in the book as a whole and have
little resultant effect." Ibid. at 707.
22",. . We think that Ulysses is a book of originality and sincerity of
treatment and that it has not the effect of promoting lust. Ibid. at 706.
derstandas and tends to cause them to merge their identity with
the rest of the book.
Judge Woolsey, in the process of reaching his decision
equated obscenity with pornography. Prior to the Ulysses case
most courts had recognized a difference between the two.24
According to Judge Woolsey:
... in any case where a book is claimed to be obscene it
must first be determined, whether the intent with iwhich
it was written was what is called ... pornographic, that
is, written for the purpose of exploiting obscenity. 25
The Court of Appeals in affirming Judge Woolsey's decision did
not pass upon this precise point. Instead the court used the
"obscene in its dominant effect" test. This latter test is far more
conducive to a successful prosecution than the one proposed by
Judge Woolsey, for the element of an intentional publication of
obscene literature for the sake of obscenity alone is not necessary
to a conviction under the test.
A peculiarity of both the decision in the District Court and
the Court of Appeals is that neither court attempted to define
"obscenity" in the process of formulating different tests for the
presence of obscenity. Thus while the rule of the Ulysses case
is more reasonable and more equitable than that applied in the
Hicklin case, it is subject to the criticism that it is no test for
obscenity at all, since the fundamental prerequisite for the appli-
cation of the test is a finding that the subject matter under con-
sideration is obscene. On behalf of the court it may be said
that the court is not trying to define "obscenity" as such but is
attempting to formulate the factors to be considered in determin-
ing whether or not the published matter should be removed from
public circulation. Once the determination to ban the publica-
2 3
"Ulysses is not an easy book to read oAr to. un.derstand ... in order prop-
erly to approach the consideration of it-it is advisable to read a number
of books wfiich have now become its satellites . . " United States v.
One Book.Eiititled Ulysses, 5 F.Supp. .182, 183 (SD.N.Y. 1933), afTd,
72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir-,1934).
24 Porography is literature written solely or primarily for the purpose of
exploiting obscenity. Obscenity on the other hand may be language
interposed in a piece of literature for the purpose of characterization,
realism, or simply to shock the reader.
25 United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, supra, note 23, at 183.
don has been made, the court affixes the label of obscenity to the
printed matter to justify and characterize its result.
Many other tests for obscenity have been developed by the
courts, and more often the emphasis has been placed upon the
effects produced by reading the publication in question rather
than the nature of the words and expressions themselves.
In Commonwealth v. Isenstadt,26 the defendant was con-
victed of selling and having in his possession for the purpose of
sale an obscene book.- The book in question is Strange Fruit
which deals with the problem of miscegenation and race relations
in the South. The court in overruling the defendant's exceptions
to the judge's ruling, pointed out the fact that the statute under
which the prosecution was brought was designed to protect the
morals of youth. As such, the test for obscenity, under the statute,
is whether the book, Strange Fruit, would be likely to have young
people among its "probable readers" 27 and, if so, whether the
book has a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt these
youthful readers by inciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful
desires.
Judge Lummus in his dissent points out the fact that the
record contained no evidence to show that any adolescent had
ever read the book or ever would read it under normal condi-
tions. Nevertheless the fact of a prosecution for obscenity normal-
ly arouses undue and unnatural interest in a book among both
adults and adolescents alike. Therefore by bringing the indict-
ment, the State has, to a certain extent, provided a "probable
audience" which will conform to the requirements of the statute.
In applying such a statute as Massachusetts enacted and
used in the Isenstadt case, most courts adopt a variation of the
rule of the Hicklin case. The variation being that if the average
adolescent would not tend to be depraved or corrupted by the
book, the fact that an occasional young person might be so in-
fluenced would not make the book obscene.28
20 318 Mass. 543, 62 NZE.2d 840 (1945).
27 ,.. under each of the prohibitions contained in the statute the test of
unlawfulness is to be found in the effect of the book upon its probable
readers .. ." Ibid. at 844.
28 The obscenity statute in Virginia is substantially the same as that in
Massachusetts, and it is very likely that should there be a prosecution
under the statute, barring unconstitutionality, the Virginia courts would
reach a similar result. See Va. Code, §18-113 (1950).
A modification of the Hicklin" Rule is still the test in at least
one jurisdiction in the United States. New Hampshire by statute
defines an obscene book as one
... whose main theme or a notable part of which tends
to impair, or to corrupt, or to deprave, the moral be-
havior of anyone viewing or reading it.s9
It is not always necessary to obscenity that the prurient
passage be likely to produce improper conduct on the part of the
reader. A number of statutes concern themselves with the effect
upon his mind and emotions alone. In United States v. Levine,30
which involved a statute directed against publications stimudating
sensuality, the Court of Appeals approved of a jury charge that
the literature was not to be measured by its effect upon the
"highly educated" or upon the "highly prudish" mind, but instead
was to be measured by its effect upon the "usual, average human
mind".3 1 The conviction for mailing obscene material through
the mails was nevertheless reversed because the judge in the trial
court delivered part of his charge to the jury under the mistaken
apprehension that a book or passage was obscene or innocent by
an absolute standard independent of its readers and that a single
tainted passage might condemn the whole book.
In other cases in which the prosecution was brought under
a statute which forbade selling or offering for sale an "obscene,
lewd, indecent, lascivious, disgusting, or filthy" book, the courts
have held that a book does not fall within the condemnation of
the statute unless conduct is involved 3 2 The State of New York
in People v. Creative Age Press, brought an action against a
publisher for the sale of a book entitled The Gilded Hearse. The
2 9 New Hampshire Laws, 1953, C. 233, p. 326.
30 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
31 In Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1945), a pamphlet
'Treparing for Marriage" was involved in a prosecution brought under
a similar statute passed during President Grant's administration. The
court said: " . . If a publication as a whole is not stimulating to the
senses of the ordinary reader, it is not within the statute."
82 Occasionally a book sent through the mails is obscene for sheer nastiness.
Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1953): "... . The civili-
zation of our times holds to the premise that dirt in stark nakedness
is not generally and at all times acceptable:'
S 192 Misc. 18g, 79 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1948).
court found that the book was not obscene under the statute
because:
To determine whether a book falls within the condemna-
tion of the statute, an evaluation must be made of the
extent to which the book as a whole would have a de-
moralizing effect on its readers, specifically respecting
sexual behavior...34
Since the primary purpose of the book was to show the shame
and guilt, the grief and hardship, which marital infidelity ul-
timately brings to the participants, the book could not have the
demoralizing effect contemplated by the statute.
The courts have frequently looked to the literary, scientific,
and educational values of a book in determining whether or not
it is obscene. A vigorous dispute has been going on for many
years concerning the validity of this Artistic Merit Test. Those
persons whose sensibilities are easily offended tend to feel that
artistic merit is no excuse for the publication of a book which is
obscene to any degree. With the opinion of Lord Cockburn in
the Hicklin case, the Artistic Merit Test was discarded in favor
of the rule that if any part of a book was obscene the entire book
was obscene. This rule has come to be known as the Partly
Obscene Test.3 5 This rule is the "orthodox test" for obscenity in
literature and was uniformly applied in England and the colonies
for many years. Recently, however, with the opinion of the
court in Ulysses case, the trend has been towards the develop-
ment of a formulation that a book is not obscene unless it is
wholly obscene, i.e., unless it is obscene in its dominant effect.
The development of the Wholly Obscene Test has given judges
and juries a much greater opportunity to exercise a personal dis-
cretion in their decisions as to whether or not a book is obscene.
Frequently the turning point in a close case is the sincerity-
of the author36 and the artistic merit of his work. 7 Despite thi-.
84 Ibid. at 201.
35 It is thought that the test developed out of an old rule of pleading that
required the indictment to specify the parts of a book alleged to be
obscene. Commonwealth v. McCance, 164 Mass. 162, 41 N.E. 133 (1895);
Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass, 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930).
386 United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 569 (2d Cir. 1930).
3 7 United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, supra, note 23.
fact a few courts still adhere to the view that the literary qualities
of a book are irrelevant.3 Although in Massachusetts the literary
qualities of a book are not too important, they are not entirely
ignored.3 9 In New York the courts have reached the opposite
extreme and have occasionally held that the obscene literature
law is totally inapplicable to works of genuine literary value.40
As a general rule the artistic merit of the book is important, but
it is by no means conclusive, especially where the court believes
that the author was insincere in the purpose with which he wrote
the book.41
As we have seen from the previous discussion, obscenity
may be all things to all people. However, there is one thing that
obscenity is not Obscenity is not static. It is a constantly
changing concept which takes its fabric from the warp and the
woof of the society in which it is spun. Judge Struble in State v.
Lerner,42 had this to say:
Obscenity is not a legal term. It cannot be defined so
that it will mean the same to all people all the time,
everywhere. 'Obscenity' is very much a figment of the
imagination,-an indefinable something in the minds of
some and not in the minds of others; and is not the same
in the minds of the people of every clime and country,
nor the same today that it was yesterday or will be to-
morrow.s
The summation, however, belongs to Judge Learned Hand who
in United States v. Kennery,- said:
... should not the word 'obscene' be allowed to indicate
the present critical point in the compromise between
candor and shame at which the community may have
arrived here and now?45
38 People v. Dial Press, 182 Misc. 416, 48 N.Y.Supp.2d 480 (1944).
39 Attorney General v. Book Named "God's Little Acre", 326 Mass. 281,
93 NE.2d 819 (1950).
40People v. Viking Press, 147 Misc. 813, 264 N.Y.Supp. 534 (1933); People
v. Miller, 155 Misc. 446, 279 N.Y.Supp. 583 (1935).
41 People v. Berg, 241 App.Div. 543, 272 N.YSupp. 586, 587 (1934).
4281 N.E.2d 282 (Ohio C.P. 1948).
43 Ibid. at 286.
44209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
45 Ibid. at 121.
Constitutional Limitations
The problems of obscenity and the protections of a free
speech and a free press afforded by the First Amendment and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmente6 have recent
origins in our constitutional history.
In Chaplinsky v. Nev Hampshire,4 7 a statute forbade the use
of offensive or annoying words in a public place and had been
interpreted by the New Hampshire Supreme Court as being
limited to the use in public of words directly tending to provoke
a breach of the peace. The Court in affirming a conviction found
that the statute as construed by the New Hampshire State Courts
was not vague and indefinite and was a valid exercise of the
police power of the state. In the course of his opinion, Justice
Murphy, by way of dictum, commented:
... There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitu-
tional problem. These include the lewd, and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting... words...48
Later the Court upheld an Illinois statute49 which made it a crime
to distribute in public places pamphlets which portrayed un-
chastity or a lack of virtue in any class of citizens or of any race.
Thus obscene speech in pamphlets circulated publicly was placed
in the same unprotected category as obscene language spoken
in public places.
The Court, however, had not yet squarely faced the problem
of obscenity in a book or other literary publication. To refuse
constitutional protection to the use of obscene language in public
places, or pamphlets libelous of a race or class, was clearly correct
because such language had never been thought to represent an
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and therefore was of
little social value in relation to the interest of society in order
and morality.
46Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S.
147 (1939).
47 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
48 Ibid. at 571 and 572.
49 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
When the problem did arise the Supreme Court was faced
with the problems of prior restraint, certainty, and reasonableness
of the statute.
Initially, the Court upheld state obscenity statutes, and it is
only recently that literature challenged on the grounds of ob-
scenity has begun to receive any measure of constitutional pro-
tection.
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint was first enunciated by
Blackstone:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature
of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous
restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from
censure for criminal matter published. Every freeman
has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom
of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mis-
chievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his
own temerity. 0
In America the first case to formulate the doctrine fully was
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson.5' The Court pointed out that
there were certain exceptions to the prior restraint principle and
that one of these exceptions pertained to obscene publications.
It was not, however, very long before the Court became
disturbed over the uncertainty and ambiguity of the meaning of
"obscenity" as used in the state statutes. While not saying that
obscenity as such was constitutionally protected, the Court began
to find some of these statutes unconstitutional because of their
vagueness and ambiguity. In Winters v. New York, 5 2 the Court
reversed a conviction under the New York statute which pro-
hibited the distribution of magazines consisting primarily of
stories of lust and crime "so massed as to become vehicles for
inciting violent and depraved crimes against the person." The
ground for reversal was that the statute was so uncertain and
indefinite that it included, according to the language used, the
5o 4 Bl.Com. 151, 152.
51283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
52 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
punishment of events within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In 1948 in Ohio, a dealer in books was prosecuted under an
Ohio statute5 which forbade the sale, or the offering for sale,
of an obscene "writing, advertisement, or circular." An amend-
ment to the statute prohibited the sale, or the holding for sale, of
"books, pamphlets, and magazines" not "wholly obscene." The
dealer was prosecuted because he had offered for sale a magazine
entitled "Sunshine and Health". The state did not maintain that
the magazine was wholly obscene but it did claim that the maga-
zine was partially obscene because of the pictures of nude men
and women contained within it. The Court of Common Pleas
found the defendant not guilty and also found that the amend-
ment to the statute was in violation of Article I, Section II, of the
Ohio Constitution which provided that:
. . . no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech, or of the press."
The Court remarked that there was no valid reason for finding
books, papers, pamphlets and magazines obscene when they only
contained a few objectionable passages and finding writings, ad-
vertisements, and circulars not obscene unless they were objec-
tionable in their entire content. Proclaiming that there is a "rule
of reason" which the courts must follow in construing the ob-
scenity statutes, the court pointed out that it is extremely difficult
to define exactly what types of literature the legislature intended
to prohibit when it banned the sale of obscene literature. Since
each case must depend on its own facts, it is unreasonable to pro-
vide any test other than that the book be wholly obscene or
obscene in its dominant effect. The court remarked:
... In holding an 'obscene book' as one 'wholly obscene'
we are supported by the weight of recent decisions."
A recent decision by the Supreme Court has continued the
trend of extending the constitutional protections of free speech
and free press to publications alleged to be obscene, upon the
53 State v. Lemer, supra, note 42.
54Ibid. at 290.
55 Ibid. at 288.
failure of the legislature to set the proper standard or the courts
to apply the proper test for obscenity.
In Butler v. Michigan,6 the defendant was convicted for
violating a Michigan statute which made it an offense to make
available for the general reading public a book that is found to
have a potentially deleterious influence upon youth. The Supreme
Court in reversing the conviction noted that Michigan already
had one statute specifically designed to protect children from ob-
scene literature tending to corrupt them. The Court then went
on to say:
We have before us legislation not reasonably re-
stricted to the evil with which it is said to deal. The
incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult popula-
tion of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children. 1
Another recent case involved one of the Court's pronounce-
ments upon the Doctrine of Prior Restraint. The case of Kingsley
Books, Inc., v. Brown58 involved an action for an injunction
under Section 22 of a New York statute authorizing the legal
officer of a municipality to maintain an action for injunction
against the sale or distribution of indecent written or printed
matter. The statute provided the seller or distributor with a right
to a trial of the issues within one day after joinder of issues and
a decision within two days of the conclusion of the trial. In con-
nection with the application of this statute, New York authorized
the use of an injunction pendente lite. Appellants challenged the
constitutionality of Section 22-a on the ground that it operated
as a prior restraint upon the publications affected. Justice Frank-
furter, in upholding the constitutionality of the statute, made it
clear that the New York statute unlike the Minnesota statute
in Near v. Minnesota, withheld restraint upon material not yet
published and not yet found to be obscene. The fact that the
statute provided for satisfactory procedural safeguards in the
56 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
t Judge Forrest B. Wall of Municipal Court, Newport News, Virginia,
recently ruled that the Newport News ordinance pertaining to obscene
literature was unconstitutional on the basis of its close similarity to the
Michigan statute of the above cited case. Daily Press Newport News,
Warwick, Hampton, December 13, 1957.
58 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
form of an immediate trial of the issues followed by a prompt de-
cision in the case saved it from a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The issuance of an in-
junction pendente lite was reasonably adapted to the proper end
which the statute sought to effectuate. It is significant that no
question as to the reasonableness of the standard of propriety
adopted by the legislature, or the test of obscenity used by the
trial court was raised in this case. However, Justices Douglas
and Black dissented upon the ground that it was no defense that
the statute only involved a "little encroachment" or a slight prior
restraint. They also point out that the statute makes one criminal
conviction for obscenity conclusive, and authorizes a statewide
decree, when in fact the composition of the persons among whom
the obscene matter was distributed may vary widely from city
to city and will undoubtedly have an important influence upon
the determination of guilt in each case. Justice Brennan dis-
sented, remarking that the statute was fatally defective in that it
failed to provide for a right to a jury trial. Chief Justice Warren
also dissented because he felt that the New York statute placed
the book on trial without providing in the statute any standard
for judging the book in context.
In a case heard and decided on the same day as the Kingsley
Books case, the Court was squarely presented with the question of
whether written matter which had been previously determined to
be obscene in the lower state and district courts was entitled to
the protection afforded by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Roth v. United States"9 involved the appeals of Roth and Alberts
from convictions under separate federal and state statutes dealing
with obscene publications. The federal statute involved in Roth's
appeal made it a felony to send obscene matter through the mails.
The California statute challenged in Albert's appeal made it a
misdemeanor to keep for sale or advertise material that is indecent.
Justice Brennan, speaking for a majority of the Court, disposed
of both appeals on the basis of whether or not obscenity is an
utterance within the area of protected speech and press. In affirm-
ing both convictions the Court laid stress upon the fact that
obscenity per se has never been within the protection of the
Constitution because purely obscene literature is of no "redeeming
social importance". The court also found that the "Clear and
59 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Present Danger" test used by Judge Bok in Commonwealth v.
Feigenbaum60 did not apply to obscene matter; a federal obscenity
statute prohibiting the sending of obscene matter through the
mails is a proper exercise of the power delegated to Congress by
the Constitution to establish post offices and post roads; the cer-
tainty required in an obscenity statute is that the language convey
a sufficiently definite warning of the proscribed conduct as
measured by common understanding and practices; and the federal
government by its statute did not preempt the field since the
federal statute was limited to federal postal functions. -Chief
Justice Warren concurred because he felt that the state and
federal governments by these statutes had constitutionally pro-
hibited the conduct of dealing in obscene publications, although
the same statutes might not constitutionally condemn any par-
ticular book as obscene. Justice Harlan concurred in the Court's
approval of the conviction under the California statute because
the states have the right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
enact reasonable laws under the police power as long as the exer-
cise of this power is "consistent with our concepts of ordered
liberty." However, Justice Harlan dissented from the Court's
affirmation of the conviction of Roth because the opinion of the
majority relegated the final determination of obscenity to the
trier of fact in the lower court when in truth the Supreme Court
should be the final arbiter of this question; the Court also failed
to distinguish the added freedom which is given to state legis-
latures whdn they pass laws on obscenity from the limited scope
of permissible Federal legislation;61 and the federal statute failed
to conform to the definition of obscenity approved by the
American Law Institute and adopted as the correct standard by
the majority of the court.62 Justices Douglas and Black joined in
60 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950).
61... Such powers as the Federal Government has in this field are but inci-
dental to its other powers, here the postal power, and are not of the
same nature as those possessed by the States, which bear direct respon-
sibility for the protection of the local moral fabric. Roth v. United
States, supra, note 59, at 504.
62
"We perceive no significant difference between the meaning of obscenity
developed in the case law and the definition of the A.L.I., Model Penal
Code, §207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957), viz.: '... . A thing is ob-
scene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient
interest, i.e, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion,
and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in
description or representation of such matters...' (Emphasis added)
Ibid. at 487.
dissent, as they had in the Kingsley Books case, because as they
put it:
The absence of dependable information on the effect
of obscene literature on human conduct should make us
wary. It should put us on the side of protecting society's
interest in literature, except and unless it can be said that
the particular publication has an impact on action that
the government can control... the test that suppresses
a cheap tract today can suppress a literary gem tomor-
row.s
From these recent cases it is clear that in principle obscene
matter per se is not within the protection of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. If, however, the
legislature has failed to set forth in the statute the proper standard
for determining the propriety of written matter, or if the trier of
the fact in the lower court has failed to apply the proper test
for obscenity to the facts of an individual case, and this failure
is the question before the court on appeal, a majority of the Court
will, in all probability, find that the statute contravenes the First
or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, or will remand
the case to the lower court for the framing of a proper charge to
the jury on the issue of obscenity. Chief Justice Warren appears
to feel that the decisive factor is whether or not the statute in
question is penal in nature and prohibits the handling of an ob-
scene book, or whether the statute merely seeks to ban, suppress,
of destroy an obscene book. Justice Harlan feels that federal
obscenity statutes have an attenuated jurisdiction; however state
legislatures may enact any laws which do not so subvert the
fundamental liberties of the Due Process Clause that they cannot
be sustained as a rational exercise of the police power. Justices
Black and Douglas would protect obscene literature by applying
the "Clear and Present Danger" test of the Dennis" case to ob-
scenity statutes, and would hold the statutes constitutional only
when they prohibit a use of speech or press which appears likely
to create an imminent danger of the perpetration of an unsocial
act, i.e., "substantive evil."
Ilbid. at 511 and 514.
64 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
CONCLUSION
The test for obscenity has passed through two distinct periods
of development in the American courts and is now entering upon
a third period of development.
The first period is represented by the Hicidin Rule. This
rule has also been known as the Partly Obscene Test. The Hicklin
Rule is no longer the law since any application of it by statute
would be unduly restrictive of the freedom of speech and press
guaranteed by the First Amendment and incorporated into the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. O It would
seem therefore that any provision applying a test for obscenity
such as was enacted into the New Hampshire Code in 195 3ee
must now be declared unconstitutional if challenged on the basis
of a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The second period is represented by the rule of the Ulysses
case. This rule is known as the Obscene-in-its-Dominant-Effect
Test or the Wholly Obscene Test. In deciding whether a book
is obscene in its net effect, the courts have placed emphasis upon
the verdict of the past and the estimation of approved critics. In
the quarter of a century following the Ulysses decision the
groundwork was laid for the development of a new and more
limited test for obscenity.
With the'decision in the Roth case, a third period, marked by
the enunciation of a Prurient Interest Test for obscenity, is be-
ginning to develop. The Supreme Court appears to be returning
to the idea of Judge Woolsey 67 that a book is not obscene unless
it is written for the purpose of exploiting the degrading aspects
of sex, i.e., is pornographic in its substance and intent. Obscenity
is the act of appealing to that which is basest in human nature, not
for the purpose of pointing a moral or narrating a story that is
built upon the passions and emotions that motivate the human
race, but solely for the purpose of arousing base ideas in the
65 In Roth v. United States, supra, note 59, at 489, the court said: 'The
Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon
the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately
treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally re-
strictive of the freedom of speech and press."
0 Supra, note 29.
67 Supar, note 25.
reader. The titillation and enticement of the reader are the end
and not the means of reaching an end of some redeeming social
importance. The prurient appeal must predominate throughout
the book and control its purpose and effect. The central element
of the Wholly Obscene Test has thus been retained and in-
corporated into the Prurient Interest Test. A difference is found,
however, in the fact that the latter test is now to be administered
by the normal, average person in the community rather than by a
few selected and approved critics.
The three tests represent a consistent line of development in
the law of obscenity. The legislatures and the courts have been
narrowing the scope of obscenity and increasing the field of
artistic license. Such a trend in the application of the First Amend-
ment liberties of free speech and free press is highly desirable
and is in accord with an accepted constitutional doctrine pro-
viding for a liberal protection of First Amendment rights and
privileges.
